On the Okinawan Multitude

Toward a New Policy Paradigm for Reorganization-Reduction of the U.S. Bases in Okinawa

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While accounting for only 0.6 percent of Japan’s total landmass, Okinawa shoulders more than 70 percent of facilities in Japan for the exclusive use of U.S. military forces. On top of this disproportionate burden, in 1996, the U.S. and Japanese governments proposed to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station by building a new facility within Okinawa. Protests in Okinawa over the past two decades have made it clear just how unfair and unreasonable this proposal is by blocking all plans to construct such a facility. Yet the protests have also been criticized as “opposition only” for their failure to present a policy alternative to the Futenma relocation proposal. As an anthropologist who has studied Okinawa’s U.S. base issues since 1997, I write this essay to respond to this criticism.

My argument develops in three steps, with the following question explored as its guiding thread: does the current global security order, underpinned by the might of the U.S. military, represent the general will—defined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as “the unvarying will of all the members”—of the global society? First, I situate local desire for reorganization-reduction of the U.S. bases in two foundational events of Okinawa’s modernity—the Battle of Okinawa (1945) and U.S. rule of Okinawa (1945-1972)—while tracing how this desire, as a foundation of the “unvarying will of all the members” of Okinawa to achieve peace, has been articulated and rearticulated by different social actors in postwar Okinawa. Second, I discuss what I call the “Okinawan multitude,” highlighting how they transform Okinawa’s general will under new historical...

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1 Part of this essay was presented at the University of Kentucky’s Modern and Classical Languages, Literatures & Cultures Departmental Colloquium held on 14 February 2017. In finalizing this essay, I benefited enormously from the comments and questions of the participants.

2 In December 2016, more than half (or about 4,000 hectares) of the Northern Training Area was returned, reducing Okinawa’s burden of U.S. military exclusive-use facilities in Japan from 74.5 percent to 70.6 percent. Ishimatsu Wataru, “Okinawa no Hokubukunrenjō Henkan, Nichibei Seishikigō, Hondofukko Saidai” [Return of Okinawa’s Northern Training Area, Japan and the United States Officially Agreed, the Largest Return Since the Okinawa Reversion], Asahi Shimbun, 22 December 2016.
circumstances of globalization. Third, as an alternative policy paradigm to supersede the Futenma relocation proposal, I explore the idea of “a security alliance without permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa/Japan” in a manner that grafts the general will of Okinawa onto that of the global society.

This essay uses and elaborates on some of the analyses presented in my book, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, and a subsequent preface to a forthcoming edition of that book.⁴ In so doing, however, it departs from the pacifist position—a belief that peace will arrive only when the military is abolished—which is often advocated in Okinawa’s anti-base struggles and implicitly assumed in my previous writings. Specifically, I posit that the measured use of force is acceptable, even necessary, under certain circumstances involving violence, insofar as it expresses the will of all the members—not the privileged few—of the global society to construct peace and prosperity for all.

Past as Present, or, How the Will for Peace Has Been Expressed by Different Social Actors in Postwar Okinawa

In September 1995, a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl was gang-raped by three U.S. servicemen. In an attempt to placate Okinawa’s anger, the U.S. and Japanese governments announced in April 1996 that the land used for Futenma Air Station—a strategically vital U.S. Marine Corps facility of approximately five hundred hectares located in a congested residential area in central Okinawa—would be returned within five to seven years. This return, however, was contingent upon a number of provisions. Chief among these was the construction of a Futenma replacement facility (hereafter FRF) within Okinawa. By December 1996, the U.S. and Japanese governments chose Henoko, a sparsely populated coastal community in northern Okinawa and home to U.S. Marine Corps Camp Schwab, as the site of the FRF.⁵

A basic conflict over the FRF construction emerged at this juncture. From the perspective of the U.S. and Japanese governments, the central question is how to reorganize and reduce U.S. military bases in Okinawa without sacrificing their functions as the linchpin of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. According to this view, bases in Okinawa are a deterrent, essential to the peace and prosperity of Japan and East Asia. From the

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⁵ Special Action Committee on Okinawa, “The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report),” 2 December 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html (date accessed: 13 December 2016). This document somewhat vaguely stated that the FRF “will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa,” but it was understood by the parties involved that “the east coast of the main island of Okinawa” meant Henoko.
Okinawan perspective, however, the issue at stake is how to reorganize and reduce the U.S. bases to restore the well-being of Okinawans, which the bases have disrupted through ear-splitting jet noise, land pollution, and accidents, as well as crimes committed by U.S. servicemen. The notion of U.S. bases in Okinawa as a deterrent no longer makes much sense in a new post–Cold War security environment, in which military capabilities must be decentralized in a network, rather than concentrated in one place such as Okinawa, in order to reduce vulnerability to outside attacks and to cope with diversified contingencies across the globe. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is important for the peace and prosperity of Japan and beyond, Okinawa adds, the burden of U.S. bases must be shared equally across the nation; constructing the FRF within Okinawa denies this elementary logic of fairness. Over the past two decades, the FRF issue has revolved around this tension over the meaning of “reorganization-reduction” of the bases in Okinawa.

Two foundational events of Okinawan modernity mark the intensity of local desire for base reorganization-reduction, upon which Okinawa’s general will for peace has been formed. The first is the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, during which Okinawans, the object of prolonged discrimination by the Japanese, were essentially sacrificed to protect the mainland of the then Japanese Empire. The death toll reached 150,000—a quarter of the prefectural population at the time. Most were killed under the barrage of American bombs and artillery fire, but some were killed by Japanese troops who, instead of protecting Okinawans, protected themselves by, for instance, driving them away from shelters. During this battle, the U.S. military enclosed a vast extent of Okinawan land for their bases, an act that prepared for U.S. military rule of Okinawa from 1945 to 1972, the second foundational event of Okinawa’s modernity. Tokyo sacrificed Okinawa once again, this time by allowing the U.S. military to turn it into the “Keystone of the Pacific” for the containment of communist threats, a process that facilitated the recovery and economic development of postwar Japan. Violation of basic human rights of Okinawans by the U.S. military was all too common, exemplified by additional seizures of Okinawan land for base construction and expansion in the 1950s. These two events of “sacrifice”—the war and U.S. military rule—have formed the basis of Okinawa’s general will for peace, articulated by different social actors in postwar Okinawa through their attempts to reorganize and reduce the U.S. bases.

In the 1950s and 1960s, a division had already existed between pro-base residents who reluctantly accepted and sometimes actively supported the presence of the U.S. bases for economic reasons and anti-base residents who opposed it in search of political self-autonomy. Both, however, lived on the same socioeconomic plane, constituting...
the poor and oppressed Okinawan minshū (people) who depended, directly or indirectly, on the U.S. bases for their livelihoods. United by shared experiences of the two events of sacrifice, the Okinawan “people,” the first postwar generation, collectively expressed Okinawa's general will for peace by mobilizing island-wide actions such as the resistance to the U.S. military’s land seizures in the 1950s and the movement for the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa from the United States to Japan in the 1960s and the early 1970s.

After the Okinawa reversion in 1972, Tokyo began injecting funds for infrastructure and economic development into Okinawa as political compensation for the continuing presence of the U.S. military there, helping Okinawa's private sector economy grow to an extent that Okinawans were no longer as dependent on base-related revenue as before. As a result, the poorer working-class “people” who still depended economically on the U.S. bases were sharply confronted by an increasing number of educated, middle-class, anti-base “citizens” who made their living without depending on the bases. It is these citizens, called shimin locally, who articulated the Okinawa's general will in the 1980s and 1990s.

Okinawan shimin were the second postwar generation born during U.S. rule of Okinawa (1945-1972), the “post-generation” having not directly experienced the war. In the 1980s and 1990s, they increasingly defined forms of social discourses and practices vis-à-vis the first generation, which had known both war and alien rule and the third generation who had known neither. In 1990, indeed, the first generation (forty-five years old or older) became a minority, at approximately 30 percent of the population, while the second generation (eighteen to forty-five years old) accounted for 39 percent and the third generation (under eighteen years old) accounted for 31 percent. Against the background of this newly emerging intergenerational arrangement, the first generation's direct experience of the war and U.S. rule was rearticulated as Okinawa's collective memory by the subsequent generations. The second generation, who were in their prime in the 1990s, played a particularly important role in constructing this collective memory as a core element of Okinawan citizen identity. In the protests against the 1995 rape and the FRF construction in Henoko after 1997, specifically, the second generation powerfully embedded Okinawa’s collective memory in global citizenry discourses on the promotion of peace, the protection of the environment, and the empowerment of women, in a manner that asserted Okinawa's general will for peace through a determined political demand for reorganization-reduction of the U.S. bases.

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The Okinawan Multitude: A Transformative Social Agent in the Twenty-first Century

Over the past decade, Okinawa’s general will has been expressed by yet another emerging social actor in a new socioeconomic context of uncertainty, inequality, and insecurity. The notion of the “precariat”\(^\text{11}\) provides a useful entry point into the status of this social actor. This concept sheds critical light on the global market economy’s impact on the living conditions of workers of all countries, whose wages have been relentlessly lowered through outsourcing, layoffs, deregulations, and other neoliberal measures. Okinawan workers have also been impoverished, though for a slightly different reason. The majority of Okinawan industries, increasingly protected by the government funds for infrastructure and economic development, shut down innovation, growth, and transformation in their business practices by refusing to raise Okinawan workers’ wages.\(^\text{12}\) Consequently, the number of non-full-time workers in Okinawa increased dramatically from 75,000 (17.1 percent of the employed labor force) in 1992 to 238,000 (43.0 percent) in 2012, highest among the nation’s prefectures.\(^\text{13}\) The poverty rate of children in Okinawa, an estimated 30 percent, is also the highest in the nation.\(^\text{14}\) In the process, the distinction between the middle-class (and typically anti-base) “citizens” and the working-class (and typically pro-base) “people” in the 1980s and 1990s has significantly attenuated, if not completely evaporated; both have disintegrated into an aggregate of precarious lives.

Though useful, the concept of the precariat tends to focus on the suffering—lack of jobs, securities, and hope—of the people as victims of globalization.\(^\text{15}\) I, for one, want to explore how those in the precariat transform themselves into creative social actors with agency and hope, by examining Okinawa’s struggles against the FRF construction as an example. Following Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude—a decentered and often unavowable network of singularities that act in common and thus rule themselves\(^\text{16}\)—I call these creative social actors in Okinawa “the Okinawan multitude.” Their sensibilities are shaped not only by the first and second generations, but also increasingly by the third generation born after the Okinawa reversion. In 2015, the majority, or approximately 53 percent of the Okinawan population, indeed fell into the third generation (forty-three years old or younger), while approximately 34 percent fell into


\(^{13}\) “\textit{Hiseiki Koyōsha, 30nende 2.7bai: Seikikyūjin, Izen Hikuku}” [270 Percent Increase of Non-full-time Workers Over 30 Years: Demand for Full-time Workers Remains Low], \textit{Ryukyu Shimpō}, 1 November 2015.

\(^{14}\) “\textit{Shasetsu: Kodomo Hinkon—Sōryoku Ageta Torikumi Isoge}” [Editorial: Poverty of Children—Hasten to Implement Measures by Joining Our Forces], \textit{Ryukyu Shimpō}, 1 August 2015.

\(^{15}\) Standing, \textit{The Precariat}, vii.

the second generation (between forty-three and seventy years old) and 14 percent fell into the first generation (older than seventy).\footnote{Okinawaken, Heisei 27nen Jyūmin Kihon Daichō Nenrei Jinkō [Residents Register 2015, Population by Age and Sex], http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/kikaku/shichoson/2422.html (date accessed: 4 December 2016).} Emerging in this new intergenerational composition are two mechanisms that contribute to the production of the Okinawan multitude whose will, I suggest, constitutes part of “the unvarying will of all the members” of the global society.

First, internally, as the pro-base/anti-base divide has attenuated over the past decade, the Okinawan multitude has rearticulated this divide into a site of empowerment. The intensified governmental attempt to construct the FRF in Henoko since 2014, in particular, has enabled the rhetoric of \textit{sabetsu} (discrimination)—i.e., Japanese discrimination against Okinawa ever since, or even before, the Battle of Okinawa—to develop, uniting Okinawans, either anti-base or pro-base, under a common Okinawan identity against Tokyo. On the one hand, in the eyes of those leaning toward the anti-base position, the FRF construction represents Tokyo’s discriminatory treatment against Okinawa, in that it tramples on a local pacifist view, informed by the two foundational historical events of “sacrifice,” that the military never protects local life and that peace will not arrive until the military is abolished.\footnote{See, for instance, Shun Modoruma, \textit{Okinawa <Sengo> Zero-Nen [Zero Year "After the War" in Okinawa]} (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2005).} On the other hand, from Okinawa’s pro-base perspective, which acknowledges the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance (and thus the U.S. bases in Okinawa/Japan) to defend the “free world,” the FRF construction is discriminatory in that it reinforces the excessive burden of U.S. bases upon the shoulders of Okinawans. Takeshi Onaga, Okinawa’s governor since November 2014, has effectively constituted a rallying point for both anti-base and pro-base constituencies by adamantly opposing the FRF construction.\footnote{Takeshi Onaga, \textit{Tatakau Min’i [The Public Will That Fights]} (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2015).}

Meanwhile, the rhetoric of \textit{sabetsu} is intertwined with existing discourses on the promotion of peace, the protection of the environment, and the empowerment of women, now disseminated through explosive communication not only in physical space but also in the new cyberspace of the twenty-first century. In the process, cyberspace has become a platform—and the second, external mechanism—that expands the Okinawan multitude in the following manner.

Most of those who participate in protests in Henoko carry electronic devices, including smartphones. With these devices, they capture, for instance, the use of excessive force against protestors by the riot police in front of Camp Schwab and by the Japan Coast Guard officers on Henoko’s sea. The protestors share videos and pictures, in real time through blogs, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other social networking tools. Those who live outside Okinawa but are concerned about the situation can access the information through the Internet and come to Okinawa to support the protestors. In the summer of 2016, for instance, I found that more than half the members of the canoe
team who rowed on Henoko’s sea to block the FRF construction belonged to the precariat of mainland Japan, including an underemployed woman in her twenties, a retired Korean-Japanese math teacher in his sixties, a part-time yoga instructor in her fifties, a part-time case worker in her thirties, a scientist in his fifties who does not belong to academia, and a Buddhist monk in his forties. Sympathetic foreigners also join protests. For instance, fifty members of Peace Boat (November 2014), fifteen members of Green Peace (November 2015), and eleven members of the Veterans for Peace (December 2015) came to Henoko to express solidarity with Okinawa. These outsiders also record, share, and disseminate their experiences through the Internet, helping the Okinawan multitude “occupy” not only the physical space around Camp Schwab but also the virtual space dominated by the mainstream media and others who trivialize Okinawa’s oppositional voices.

In summary, over the past decade, in their shared efforts to block the FRF construction, those in the precariat class in Okinawa and beyond have constituted themselves as an open network of critical subjects to express Okinawa’s general will for peace. Specifically, discrimination rhetoric, as intertwined with discourses of peace, the environment, gender, and related issues, has contributed to the production of the Okinawan multitude, who internally transform the pro-base/anti-base divide into a site of empowerment and externally embrace sympathetic non-Okinawans to confront the larger system of power.

Security Alliance without Permanent Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa/Japan

Despite these accomplishments, the Okinawan multitude’s protests have been criticized as “oppositions only” for their failure to present a policy alternative to the Futenma relocation proposal. I suggest that the Okinawan multitude respond to this criticism by marshaling Okinawa’s foundational historical experiences of sacrifice—the very basis of Okinawa’s general will and identity articulated by the minshū (people) in the 1950s and 1960s and by shimin (citizens) in the 1980s and 1990s—not only as

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21 “Others” include the netto-uyoku, internet right-wingers. They can be defined as impoverished and alienated members of the Japanese precariat who, attempting to displace their helplessness with pride and dignity as Japanese, spread hateful discourse against “traitors”—Okinawa’s protesters—whom they see as jeopardizing the strength and security of Japan. The origin, roles, and significance of netto-uyoku are beyond the scope of this essay and will be explored in a separate project.

a way to remember the past, but also as a policy principle for shaping the future. To assist Okinawa in accomplishing this task, I introduce the idea of *jōji-chūryūnaki anpo* (a security alliance without permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa/Japan, hereafter SAWPS).

SAWPS originated partly in *Kichi Henkan Akushon Puroguramu* (Action Program for Returning U.S. Bases to Okinawa), an Okinawa prefectural government proposal that was announced in 1996 in response to the 1995 rape incident as a crystallization of Okinawa’s historically informed general will for peace. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) refined this proposal in the late 1990s as part of its platform. SAWPS critically rearticulates the Cold War security paradigm centering on confronting, containing, and/or annihilating the “enemy.” It does so by engaging in a post–Cold War security environment, where the “enemy” has transmuted into amorphous contingencies at the level of everyday social life, such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters, refugee crises, and other threats (like China’s maritime expansion and North Korea’s nuclear program) requiring high-intensity police actions or low-intensity warfare. Construing the United Nations as a model of a supranational institution, SAWPS invokes “the unvarying will of all the members” of the global society by intervening into this new security environment with the following three mechanisms.

First, SAWPS is part of security operations of the supranational institution. This supranational institution integrates national militaries, including the U.S. military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and reorganizes them into the East Asia security forces, of which a basic function is policing—creating order and maintaining peace—in contingencies of various kinds. Second, bilateral alliances like the U.S.-Japan security alliance, created during the Cold War to contain and intimidate the “enemy,” are restructured as a forum of multilateral security dialogues across East Asia. Third, a basic principle of the Japanese constitution—renunciation of war, as stipulated in Article 9—will be actualized as Japan, together with other states, actively participates in and contributes to peacekeeping operations on the one hand and security dialogues on the other, both of which are to be led by the supranational institution for peace and prosperity of East Asia and beyond. The more thoroughly these three mechanisms are implemented, the less U.S. bases in Okinawa/Japan, a symbol of the Cold War logic of containment and intimidation, will be necessary. As an increasing number of U.S. bases become inessential and are returned to Okinawa/Japan, the U.S. military presence will

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26 Takano, Okinawani Kaiheitaiwa Iranai!, 226-262. Given a range of problems of the UN, including obliteration of the representational mechanisms through veto power in the Security Council, the description below uses the term “supranational institution” to designate one that exists as a possibility beneath the threshold of realization.

[54] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
decline until no U.S. troops are permanently stationed in Okinawa/Japan. It follows that construction of the FRF is unnecessary. This is where Okinawa's historically grounded general will for peace is materialized as a policy principle for shaping the future, in a manner not unlike the way Immanuel Kant conceptualized *perpetual peace.*

When it came to power in 2009, the DPJ led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama tried to implement foreign policies informed by SAWPS, including a controversial policy to construct the so-called “East Asia Community,” with an attempt to establish Japan’s diplomatic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. The premature resignation of Hatoyama as prime minister in 2010 and the eventual breakdown of the DPJ administration in 2012 left SAWPS unrealized. Today’s rapidly transforming global security order, however, makes revisiting SAWPS worthwhile.

This transformation is exemplified, for instance, by the ways in which the United States has supplanted the position of the supranational institution as a coordinator of militaries around the world (e.g., “the coalition of the willing” created during the Iraq War). The U.S-Japan alliance is now part of a larger global security network to cope with amorphous threats and diversified contingencies not only in East Asia but also outside it. In the process, Washington and Tokyo have tried to implement and, in some instances, have successfully implemented projects, such as: (1) transferring nine thousand Marines (of approximately sixteen thousand in Okinawa, who constitute about 60 percent of U.S. forces there), to Guam (four thousand) and Hawaii (five thousand); (2) returning some of the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa located south of Kadena Air Base; and (3) expanding the U.S. Marine Corps’ Unit Deployment Program (established in 1977) to use Australia as a new site of rotational deployment.

Notably, on the surface, these projects approximate Okinawa’s demand for reorganization-reduction of U.S. bases. Equally important, however, is the fact that these projects are anchored in an ongoing effort of the U.S. and Japanese governments to integrate the SDF thoroughly into U.S. military operations, perpetuating and reinforcing the Cold War security paradigm, now recycled to contain new “threats.” In light of the likelihood that the FRF will be used by not only the U.S. military but also eventually by the SDF, I suggest that the basic concerns of Washington and Tokyo remain how to redefine and reinforce functions of U.S. bases in Okinawa as a linchpin of the global


30 Takano, *Okinawani Kaiheitaiwa Iranai!*, 251.
security order in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{31}

I propose the idea of a security alliance without permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa/Japan as an alternative policy model to overcome the ossified Cold War security paradigm of containment. In so doing, however, I must depart from pacifism often advocated in Okinawa’s anti-base struggles. Instead, I postulate that the will of the Okinawan multitude is part of the general will of the global society seeking to construct peace and prosperity for all, with the capacity to use force if necessary. It is at this point of departure that I want to provide a tentative response to the question posed at the onset of this essay: does the current global security order, underpinned by the might of the U.S. military, represent the general will of the global society? The struggles against the FRF construction in Okinawa over the past twenty years, with an increasing number of Japanese participants, suggest a “no.” Broad opposition across “precarious Japan” in the summer of 2015 to security-related bills that allow the SDF to cooperate with the U.S. military in a wide range of situations in the name of “collective defense,” indicates a “no.”\textsuperscript{32} Continuing protests against the U.S. military and national or local governments that support their presence in Vieques (Puerto Rico), South Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, Diego Garcia, Guam, and Hawaii show additional “no’s.”\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, my ongoing research with student veterans in Kentucky reveals still another “no.” Suffering from PTSD and other difficulties, these veterans often express unarticulated resentment at unfair situations in the United States in which they, being of the precariat and without jobs, joined the military under a system whose primary beneficiaries are exempt from service. These widespread “no’s” suggest that militarization is imposed on the politically vulnerable across the globe for the bureaucratic, diplomatic, and commercial interests of the privileged few, the so-called “establishment,” in the United States, Japan, and other places of the world.

Today, populism in Europe, the United States, and Asia (including Japan) profoundly shakes the foundations of the existing mechanisms of representation in its challenge to the “establishment” that benefits from globalization. But populism, with its xenophobic tendency, disavows transformative aspects of globalization, characterized by the possibility of grassroots collaboration and connection across regions, nations, and continents. The significance of ongoing protests in Okinawa lies precisely in this possibility. I present the idea of a security alliance without permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa/Japan as a policy paradigm to materialize this possibility, a paradigm that

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\textsuperscript{31} Inauguration of Donald Trump as the new U.S. president does not seem to alter the basic framework in which bilateral security policies are formulated. See Inoue, Preface to Okinawa and the U.S. Military, paperback ed. for further discussion.
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expresses “the unvarying will of all the members” of the global society to achieve peace and prosperity for all.

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