

Migration for Human Security? *The Contribution of Translocality to Social Resilience*

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It is high time to broaden the perspective on the nexus of climate change, migration, and security. This can be done in at least two ways. First, while migration may be one important aspect of traditional security, a focus on human security directs our attention towards an issue that is equally important: the especially vulnerable situation and position of the migrants themselves. Second, connectedness established through migration—or “translocal connectedness”—contributes to improved livelihoods and, often, the human security of *those left behind*. Improved livelihoods of social units, precisely defined as “translocal social resilience,” deserves more attention than it currently receives in both social science and policy.

In past years, the dominant discourse on the climate change-migration nexus in media and policy has traditionally emphasized the potential security threat that mass migration might pose to developed countries. The current refugee situation in Europe has fueled these concerns, demonstrated by the ranking of “involuntary mass migration” as the number one security risk in the 2016 World Economic Forum’s World Risk Report, and the harsh rhetoric against refugees and immigrants in current electoral campaigns in the U.S. and various European countries.¹ While national security may be a helpful framework for actors such as the U.S. Armed Forces, the “securitization” of the debate has been rightfully critiqued as harmful.² This is also the case in Southeast Asia: the region’s exposure to present and expected climate hazards as well as its strong and dynamic regimes of domestic and international migration have made it a hotspot for the migration debate.³ Indeed, a 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank

¹ World Economic Forum, *The Global Risks Report 2016* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016).

² See Lorraine Elliot, “Human Security, Climate Change and Migration in Southeast Asia”, in *Climate Change, Migration and Human Security in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Booksmith, 2012), 1-12.

³ The German think tank Germanwatch lists Thailand as the 9th most vulnerable country out of 187 assessed: Germanwatch, *Global Climate Risk Index 2016*, by Sönke Kreft, David Eckstein, Lukas Dorsch and Livia Fischer (Berlin: Germanwatch e.V., 2015); see also Asian Development Bank, *Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific* (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2012), <http://hdl.handle.net/11540/918>.

hypothesized an increase of existing migration flows along established networks and routes in the region in a changing climate.⁴

We will thus outline in the following three sections the argument for a major paradigm shift from a one-sided traditional security perspective of migrants as a threat towards a more differentiated view on migration as a possible solution that can enhance social resilience in the face of environmental risks. We begin with (i) a critique of the three major shortcomings of a traditional security perspective, (ii) a discussion of the current shift to “migration as adaptation” and the possible ways forward in reframing the discourse from migrants as problem to migration as a solution, and then conclude with (iii) an argument for looking beyond “migration as adaptation” by taking into account translocal connections between migrants and their left-behind households, in order to understand the complex interdependencies and dynamics of the climate-migration-security nexus. This last point will be illustrated by a case study from the highly mobile and climate-impacted Southeast Asian country of Thailand.

Three Shortfalls of a Traditional Security Perspective on Climate Change and Migration

Taking a traditional security perspective on climate change and migration is myopic for a number of reasons. First, there is no universal definition of what climate change-related migration means; there is a plethora of concepts, ranging from more alarmist terms like “climate refugees” or “climate change-induced displacement,” to more cautious phrases such as “climate change-related migration” or “migration influenced by climate change.” Second, although the linkages between climate change, migration, and conflict have been researched for more than two decades, there is no clear consensus on how many climate-induced migrants there might be or to where they might be going.⁵ While predictions of climate-induced migrants ranging from 50 to 200 million are found to be ungrounded or even “guesstimates,” they are often cited in public and policy discourses, creating fear over the potential threat of climate-induced migration to national security.⁶

To clarify, we do not deny the potential impacts of climate change on migration; indeed, there are many studies suggesting that climatic factors will likely impact people’s migration decisions in the future. But two things must be noted. First, the causal

⁴ Asian Development Bank, *Climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific* (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2009).

⁵ See for example Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” *International Security* 16, no. 2 (1991); Jon Barnett, “Security and climate change,” *Global Environmental Change* 13 (2003); Jürgen Scheffran and Antonella Battaglini, “Climate and conflicts: the security risks of global warming,” *Regional Environmental Change* 11 (2011).

⁶ Norman Myers, “Environmental refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* 1420 (2002); Vikram Odedra Kolmannskog, *Future Floods of Refugee: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008).

linkages between climate change and migration are complex, and only in a few cases (e.g. recurring/prolonged droughts or sea level rise) are the linkages clear. In most cases of slow change (e.g. in precipitation patterns or temperatures), migration may be linked with gradually declining local economic conditions. And it would not be entire communities that migrate, but rather individual household members seeking additional opportunities. Second, the majority of climate change-related migrants will move internally or regionally. We thus argue that while migrants or migration can be linked to environmental change, it is misleading to sharply delineate (and attempt to count) *climate* versus *non-climate* migrants.

Third, there is an ethical dimension to the migration discussion. A focus on the state implied in the traditional national security perspective fails to acknowledge the especially vulnerable situation (the often precarious living and working conditions, social exclusion, and economic exploitation) of migrants and their families. In addition, it is often in developed countries, especially the U.S. and European states (ironically, those that are historically responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions), where climate-related mass migration is put on research and policy agendas as a potential security threat. As the U.S.-based security think tank CNA puts it, migration has “the potential to disrupt our way of life and to force changes in the way we keep ourselves safe and secure” (emphasis added).⁷

Restricting the discussion of climate change and migration to a traditional security problem is not only limited to Western states. Just recently, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also adopted climate-induced migration as a potential threat in their security policies.⁸ Momentum for such text arose from prominent regional discussions held under the auspices of the ARF from 2008 to 2011. For example, the 2008 ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue identified climate change as a threat multiplier, while the 2009 Dialogue included climate change in its discussions of a new security paradigm for the Asia-Pacific. At the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) 2011 workshop on Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration, Philippine Ambassador Enrique Manalo confirmed that ARF member states saw climate-induced forced migration as a transboundary threat.⁹

While climate change-migration-security issues are touched upon at the regional level, many countries find grappling with such complex, interrelated issues difficult. Thailand, for example, has formulated both a National Strategic Plan on Climate Change (2008-2012) and a Climate Change Master Plan (2015-2050), which provide a framework for long-term actions for both mitigation and adaptation. While they touch on energy,

⁷ CNA, *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (Alexandria, 2007): 6, 44. See also High Representative and European Commission, *Climate Change and International Security* (Brussels: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, 2008).

⁸ Elliot, “Human Security, Climate Change and Migration in Southeast Asia,” 8.

⁹ Supang Chantavanich, Carl Middleton, Michiko, Ito (eds.), “On the move: Critical migration themes from ASEAN”, http://carlmiddleton.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/OnTheMove_December-2013_ARCMIOM.pdf.

water, and food security, there is no explicit mention of migration or human security. Interviews with officials working on climate change at various ministries unveiled that migration is often seen as a potential result of climate change, especially as related to flooding, but not necessarily as a viable adaptation strategy.¹⁰

Human Security: “From Migration to Migrants” and “Migration as Adaptation”

Against this background, the turn towards human security means a real change in the perspective on climate change and migration—a shift “from migration to migrants.”¹¹ Placing migrants (individuals who are threatened, vulnerable, and in need of protection) in the center treats migration not as a potential security threat for states, but rather for the migrants themselves—as well as for their households or families when (especially forced) migration leads to the loss of livelihoods, social capital, and coping capacities.¹² This view has recently entered higher policy levels. For example, the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change looks at both the livelihoods and human security of vulnerable population groups under pressure from changing climate conditions as well as the human security of climate-induced migrants.¹³ Although in ASEAN migration is marginally acknowledged in climate change specific actions, there is little reference to human security.¹⁴ However, in 2009 the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Coordinating Council agreed to enhance coordination mechanisms across policy sectors relating to political and human security issues, especially when concerned with climate change.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Alfred Gerstl argues that ASEAN governments “have realized that they have to be at least perceived as being concerned about human insecurity,” even if they are not making concrete policy strides as of yet.¹⁶

¹⁰ Kayly Ober, Bangkok and Udon Thani, Thailand, February 2015–November 2016.

¹¹ We endorse a broader concept of human security, encompassing both freedom from fear (from violence) as well as freedom from want (from poverty, vulnerability, etc.), as initially put forward by United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 1994); Elliot, “Human Security, Climate Change, and Migration in Southeast Asia,” 2.

¹² Elliot, “Human Security, Climate Change, and Migration in Southeast Asia,” 8.

¹³ Neil Adger et al., “Human Security”, in *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*, ed. C.B. Field et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

¹⁴ Eva Mach, “Ahead of COP21 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Take Stock of Human Mobility Questions,” International Organization for Migration, <https://weblog.iom.int/ahead-cop21-intended-nationally-determined-contributions-take-stock-human-mobility-questions>.

¹⁵ Raman Letchumanan, “Is there an ASEAN policy on climate change?” *Climate Change: Is South-East Asia Up to the Challenge? LSE IDEAS Special Report 4* (London: London School of Economics, 2010), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR004/ASEC.pdf>.

¹⁶ Alfred Gerstl, “The Depoliticization and ‘ASEANization’ of Human Security in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Counter-Terrorism and Climate Change Policies,” 7th Pan European International Relations Conference, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Gerstl_Depoliticization_and_ASEANization_of_Human_Security.pdf.

While a migrant-centered perspective is more encompassing than a traditional security perspective, such a viewpoint tends to imply a pessimistic view of migration. Migration is seen as a measure of last resort when local adaptation has largely failed, and as something that should be avoided.¹⁷ In response, “migration as adaptation,” has been brought forward by international actors such as IOM.¹⁸ In this alternative, migration is not seen necessarily as a result of local adaptation *failure*, but rather as a legitimate and viable adaptation *strategy* that is actively adopted by individuals and households to decrease vulnerability.¹⁹ Migration can be a means of adaptation through (i) diversifying livelihood portfolios, especially outside of climate-dependent agriculture; as well as (ii) strategic and timely transfer of financial remittances, ideas, and technology. Only recently has the concept gained traction in the Southeast Asian and Thai context, mostly through policy and advocacy work by IOM, as well as large research projects, and community based pilot projects in Cambodia and Thailand.²⁰ At present, the topic—and the potential—of migration as an adaptation strategy does not have a prominent place in climate change adaptation policies in Thailand or in other ASEAN countries. However, this gap is not unique to ASEAN countries, as the notion that migration could be an adaptation strategy has only very recently become a popular policy option in other parts of the world. To date, the few policy solutions which relate to migration as adaptation that have entered policymakers’ discourses have revolved around regional schemes of labor migration, as is seen in Pacific island states, which advocate for “migration with dignity.”²¹

¹⁷ Kayly Ober, “Migration as adaptation: exploring mobility as a coping strategy for climate change,” (Oxford: UK Climate Change and Migration Coalition, 2014).

¹⁸ For an extended analysis of the process of how migration as adaptation emerged and became a relevant concept in policy and science, see Romain Felli, “Managing climate insecurity by ensuring continuous capital accumulation: ‘climate refugees’ and ‘climate migrants,’” *New Political Economy* 18, no. 3 (2013): 337-363, or Giovanni Bettini, “Climate Migration as an Adaption Strategy: De-Securitizing Climate-Induced Migration Or Making the Unruly Governable?” *Critical Studies on Security* 2, no. 2 (2014): 180-195.

¹⁹ See for example Robert McLeman and Barry Smit, “Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change,” *Climatic Change* 76.1 (2006), or the influential Foresight Report: *Foresight, Migration and global environmental change: Final project report* (London: The Governance Office for Science, 2011).

²⁰ Kayly Ober and Patrick Sakdapolrak, “The Governance of ‘Migration as Adaptation:’ (Dis)Entangling Power and Politics with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice,” (forthcoming); For research project examples, “Where the Rain Falls,” CARE International and United Nations University, <http://wheretherainfalls.org/>, and MECLER, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP),” IOM, <https://www.iom.int/mecler>; In the Cambodian project, IOM was assessing the adaptive potential of labor migration and was creating awareness among local, regional and national policy makers, see “Migration, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation,” IOM, <https://www.iom.int/countries/cambodia#fm>; in the Thai project, the Germany based research project TransRe (www.transre.org) is currently conducting pilot projects in two villages, consisting for example of remittance investment trainings and mentoring programs for future migrants.

²¹ Kayly Ober, “Pacific Islanders Prepare Regional Migration Responses in Face of Climate Change, Connecting the Spots: TransRe,” <http://transre.org/en/blog/pacific-islanders-prepare-regional-migration-responses-face-climate-change>.

In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, the topic of international migration is a potentially divisive one.²² Thus, issues regarding migration have often been left “untouched” by both national and regional politics. Indeed, ASEAN member states tend to shy away from binding regional laws or mechanisms, with governments preferring regional soft law arrangements.²³ There is hope, however, that as the ASEAN community strengthens and expands, more explicit cooperation and labor migration policies will have to be outlined, with perhaps migration as adaptation making a more explicit appearance in the future.²⁴

Although the concept of migration as adaptation means a “paradigm shift” towards a better understanding of the migration-climate change nexus, it has a number of shortcomings.²⁵ First, with a narrow focus on remittances, other important dimensions of connectedness (e.g., networks, normative aspects, temporal change in connectivity) cannot be adequately addressed.²⁶ Second, limited attention on the destination regions fails to acknowledge the embeddedness of migrants within their places of arrival and how it influences remittance sending. Finally, the limitation on the household and individual level overlooks other important social and political levels: community, regional, and state. This leaves the approach open to neoliberal readings primarily concerned with entrepreneurial migrants and their role for household adaptation.²⁷ This puts the responsibility for successful adaptation on the shoulders of those who are often already the most vulnerable.

Towards a More Comprehensive View: “Translocal Social Resilience”

Social resilience can be expressed as the capacities of individuals, households and

²² Especially in regard to the large number of unregistered migrants, e.g. from Cambodia or Myanmar in Thailand, or from Thailand in Singapore or Malaysia.

²³ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, Routledge, London and New York (2009).

²⁴ “Toward a Harmonized, Rights-Based Regional Approach in Strengthening Protection of ASEAN Migrant Workers,” Policy Brief, ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC), <http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/toward-a-harmonized-rights-based-regional-approach-in-strengthening-protection-of-asean-migrant-workers>.

²⁵ François Gemenne, “One Good Reason to Speak of ‘Climate Refugees’” *Forced Migration Review* 49 (2015); Patrick Sakdapolrak et al., “Migration in a changing climate: Towards a translocal social resilience approach,” *Die ERDE* 147, no. 2 (2016).

²⁶ Networks relate to the connections between migrants and rural households, particularly their social and spatial structure—the position of individuals within these networks, the strength of ties and the spatial spreading of the networks—are influencing the level of support that households can get from migrant members. Normative aspects such as expectations and obligations towards mobility, strength of support but also return migration, are important for how much and how often remittances will be sent. Temporal changes of connectivity refers to the emergence and also decay of these linkages, for example, to the question how long migrants can stay away until their connections fade and remittance sending declines.

²⁷ Romain Felli, and Noel Castree, “Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?,” *Environment and Planning* 44, no.1 (2012).

communities to cope with risks (for example, re-seeding after a crop loss), to adapt their livelihoods (building secondary grain storage to anticipate future losses), and to transform their structural context (advocating for a better agricultural extension service).²⁸ While social resilience as a concept is rooted in an individual and household-based perspective, it leans towards human security in that it sees vulnerability as the result of structural context. While social resilience as a concept is rooted in an individual and household-based perspective, it leans towards human security in that it sees vulnerability as the result of structural context. *Translocal* social resilience is then understood as the contribution of translocal aspects to social resilience, for example, through financial remittances the transfer of goods, ideas, and knowledge, or the introduction of new attitudes by return migrants. This implies a shift of perspective on the spatial character of the *unit* that we consider to be resilient—a household or community—and to understand these units not as spatially limited to the house and its surroundings, but as intrinsically connected to other places.

Translocal social resilience—in order to contribute to human security in the full sense of freedom from fear and freedom from want—can only be adequately conceptualized if the following aspects are taken into account.²⁹

Embeddedness in multilevel human–environment systems: Individuals' and households' vulnerabilities, as well as their needs and capacities for adaptation, do not only result from their individual properties, but also from their embeddedness in social (e.g. gender, age, status, group), political (e.g. communal, district, regional, national), and ecological (e.g. local resources, relevant ecosystem services, hazards) contexts. This is crucial in order to understand root causes of vulnerabilities and to strengthen resilience.

Social practices: Translocal connections, mobility, and interactions, as well as coping with and adapting to risks are regular aspects of many people's and households' livelihoods all over the world. Hence, understanding the nexus of migration and climate change needs an understanding of people's vulnerability from the perspective of their everyday life and social practices.³⁰ We emphasize this also to counter the focus on dramatic events and crises, as the latter is less helpful in uncovering root causes of vulnerabilities.

Translocal connectivity: Rather than limiting our focus on migration as the movement of people, we should broaden our view to include translocal connections (the result of migration that happens for any number of reasons) of people and places, and all the

²⁸ Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak, "What is Social Resilience? Lessons Learned and Ways Forward," *Erdkunde* 67, no. 1 (2013).

²⁹ Sakdapolrak et al., "Migration in a Changing Climate."

³⁰ Ben Wisner, and Henry R. Luce, "Disaster Vulnerability: Scale, Power and Daily Life," *GeoJournal* 30, no. 2 (1993). We define social practices here as both socially structured and habitualized "ways of doing and saying," c.f. Theodore Schatzki, *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002): 72.

networks, practices, and flows (of finances, goods, ideas, people, etc.) that they entail.

Taking into Account Translocal Connections in Climate Change Adaptation and Human Security in Rural Thailand

With high exposure to present and future climatic risks and its dynamic migration regimes, Thailand stands out as a strong example of how translocal connections can both strengthen the social resilience of households at places of origin and support human security.³¹ A broadened perspective on the climate change–migration nexus as outlined above can shed light on issues that otherwise would remain obscured:

1) *The capacities of migrants to contribute to increased resilience through remittances is strongly linked to the local embedding in both sending and receiving contexts.* During the severe economic and drought crisis that hit Thailand and Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, already established migration networks enabled rural households to rapidly pursue international migration as an adaptation strategy.³² This can also be observed today, as the worst drought in decades has pushed more and more Thai workers to pursue opportunities in new regional areas of destination, including South Korea.³³

2) *Translocal connections and the subsequent resource flows influence local socio-ecologic interactions.* The transfer of finances and ideas, but also return migrants (equipped with knowledge, capital, and aspirations) contribute to agricultural innovation. In turn, new crops, technologies and business models entail profound changes for local socio-ecological systems. For example, in Thailand: the increasingly rapid replacement of paddy rice with sugar cane, rubber tree, or vegetables as well as the introduction of new businesses such as chicken farming in northeast Thailand. In many cases, such local innovations are raised by return migrants, or are made possible by financial means provided through remittances.

³¹ Employment in agriculture accounts for 43 percent of employment in Thailand, despite substantial industrial development and urbanization processes, see “World Databank,” The World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>. Smallholder agriculture is the prevailing mode of production, especially in the north and northeast, the country’s poorest regions, see Jonathan Rigg and Albert Salamanca. “Connecting Lives, Living and Locations,” *Critical Asian Studies* 43, no.4 (2011). These areas are also most affected by climate risks such as droughts and floods. Climate projections predict an overall temperature rise and an increasing variability of rainfall, see Sopon Naruchaikusol, “Climate Change and Its Impact in Thailand,” TransRe Factsheet No. 2 (2016). This will likely result in additional stress on agriculture, affecting productivity through increasing floods and droughts, But rural places are also nodal points of social relations of exchange and transfers; internal as well as international migration has been and will continue to be a common strategy for the rural population to cope with and adapt to the seasonality of agricultural production, land pressure, and economic crisis.

³² Patrick Sakdapolrak, “Jenseits von ‚Push and Pull‘ Internationale Arbeitsmigration als Strategie der Lebenssicherung in Thailand,” *Int. Asienforum* 39, no. 1 (2008).

³³ Mathichon Online, “Male and female youths and adults from Udon Thani attend language exams to prepare for the search for employment opportunities in Taiwan–escaping drought and decline in crop prices,” <http://www.matichon.co.th/news/48894>.

3) The spatial distribution of social support networks—from local to international—influences the ability of households to mobilize resources in times of need. Migrants at international destinations can usually provide higher remittances, but international migration also requires a higher initial investment, access to social networks, and knowledge of migration pathways.³⁴

Conclusion

To conclude, we see a number of compelling reasons to extend the currently dominant security perspective on climate change and migration. First, security concerns regarding the climate change-migration nexus suffer from a one-sided focus on the security effects of migration driven by climate change, omitting consideration of the migrants themselves, and overlooking the complexity of migration decisions and patterns. Second, it is necessary to add the perspective of human security to address the special vulnerabilities of mobile and non-mobile populations. And third, and perhaps most importantly, it is not sufficient to view either the migrants or their left-behind households in isolation, rather we have to take into account the multiple dimensions of translocal connectivity between them. For the majority of cases where mobility can be attributed to climate change in one way or the other, it is this translocal connectivity that is relevant for human security, much more than the acts of migration and dislocation themselves.

When considering the relevance of economic development and social stability for political stability, it seems reasonable to assume linkages between human security and national security; thus, policies and development efforts aiming for human security can be expected to contribute to national security as well.³⁵ But, as international migration—particularly the migration of the poor and vulnerable—is highly politicized, and as the debate and political actions are dominated by national egoism rather than international solidarity, we are not optimistic that efforts to build translocal social resilience will be realized in the near future. Sadly, the situation has not changed

³⁴ Findings from the representative household survey of the TransRe project (1,086 households from four provinces in northern and northeastern Thailand) illustrate this: the initial costs are much higher for international migration than for domestic (on average 2,500 USD for international vs 75USD for domestic migration), but the average amount of annual remittances sent by international migrants is also much higher than those sent by domestic migrants (5,000 USD compared to 570 USD). But remittance sending depends also on household composition as well as gender and marital status of the migrants—for example, the youngest daughter is especially obliged to support her parental household and remittances usually decline when the migrants have their children within their own household. Steady cash flow for many years allow households to not only cope with unforeseen risks and events, but also to adapt new agricultural practices, to acquire productive assets such as land or machinery, and to invest in higher education of the next generation. See also Patrick Sakdapolrak, “Building resilience through Translocality,” TransRe Working Paper Series 1, http://transre.org/index.php/download_file/view/182/232.

³⁵ Zarina Othman, “Human Security Concepts, Approaches and Debates in Southeast Asia,” paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference on ‘Constructing World Order,’ The Hague, Netherlands 2010, http://hexagon-series.org/pdf/Hague/Othman_Human_Security.pdf.

much since Hans Georg Bohle stated in 1991, with regard to international migration: “a comprehensive ‘New Humanitarian World Order’... would be necessary to fundamentally, and with global agreement, re-organize the entire refugee-, asylum-, nationality- and labor legislation. But the way to there is still far, and there is no reason for optimistic expectations.”³⁶

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³⁶Hans-Georg Bohle, “Flucht und Elend,” *Freiburger Uni-Magazin* 4 (1991): 7.